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This thesis examines the evolution of post-Cold War U.S. policy towards NATO as 
a case study of the way in which domestic and international pressures interact to shape 
security policy. I argue that the expansion of U.S. commitments to post-Cold War Europe 
corresponds to the way key U.S. policymaking institutions have framed American national 
interests. President Clinton, his key advisers and Republican leaders of Congress emphasize 
that NATO enlargement advances American interests by accelerating the success of 
democratic and market economy reforms in Eastern European countries and Russia. But 
NATO enlargement also serves a more defensive mission-- that of pushing back threats to 
the West from the East. 
The process that led to this definition of U.S. interests reflects the flexibility of the 
U.S. decisionmaking structure, and the sharing of powers between Congress, the president 
and other key actors. The interpretation of these national interests, in turn, have been shaped 
by two factors: geostrategic perspectives and domestic political concerns. Wide agreement 
has emerged between Congress and the Executive branch that NATO enlargement serves 
U.S. geostrategic interests. Moreover, at least until now, partisan political conflict over 
NATO enlargement has remained muted. Such conflicts could grow as new strategic 
questions emerge with the prospect of enlargement beyond the Vishegrad countries (Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic). 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is central to the fate of 
European security. The present study treats the evolution of post-Cold War NATO policy 
as a case study of the way in which domestic and international pressures interact to shape 
security policy. I argue that the expansion of U.S. commitments to post-Cold War Europe 
corresponds to the way key U.S. policymaking institutions have framed American national 
interests. President Clinton, his key advisers and Republican leaders of Congress emphasize 
that NATO enlargement advances American interests by accelerating the success of 
democratic and market economy reforms in Eastern European countries and Russia. 
President Clinton has argued that this success is in America's own national interests; indeed, 
he has stated that " ... our security in this generation will be shaped by whether reform in these 
nations succeeds." But NATO enlargement also serves a more defensive mission-- that of 
pushing back threats to the West from the East. NATO is still needed, despite the end of the 
Cold War, because "the dream of an empire is still bums in the minds of some who look 
longingly toward a brutal past." The new NATO doctrine is one of"pre-containment:" work 
for reform but be prepared for aggression. 1 
The process that led to this policy reflects the flexibility of the U.S. decisionmaking 
structure, and the sharing of powers between Congress, the president and other key actors. 
Each phase of policymaking process (such as the definition of tasks, the adoption and 
1 William Schneider, "Test- Marketing the Clinton Doctrine", National Journal, 1/22/ 
1994, p.214. 
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implementation policies, and the funding ofU.S. commitments) depends on the ability of 
these institutions to hammer out a common interpretation of national interests. 
The interpretation of these national interests, in turn, have been shaped by two factors: 
:geostrategic perspectives and domestic political concern. Wide agreement has emerged 
between Congress and the Executive branch that NATO enlargement serves U.S. 
geostrategic interests. Yet, NATO issues are also a source of possible partisan conflict. 
Republicans in Congress have chided President Clinton for proceeding too slowly on NATO 
enlargement, and pushed for a more rapid pace. This bodes well for the Vishegrad nations. 
Over the longer term, however, important strategic uncertainties persist -- and with them, 
new opportunities for partisan conflict. Political pressures to cut spending on foreign affairs, 
and increase funding for domestic programs, may (over the longer term) encourage 
policymakers to consider maintaining a more modest military presence in Europe. Such a 
reduction in U.S. force level within NATO might also make strategic sense, if doing so 
helped ease the political problems that NATO enlargement posed to pro-Democracy 
politicians in Russia. Even the possibility of such a reduction in the U.S. presence will also 
force European political circles to pay closer attention to their own security capabilities. 
No responsible authority in Europe wants a decreased U.S. commitment to NATO. However, 
if concerns over potential U.S. reductions were to strengthen the Europeans' commitment 
to provide for their own defense, this would create not only a fall-back position for European 




The picture of the world has changed dramatically with the end of the Cold War. Bitter 
rivalry between two superpowers once dominated the entire international order. In the new 
international environment Cold War era fears of nuclear holocaust have evolved into other concerns 
over the dangers to peace. Waves of local wars and regional conflicts have occurred around the 
world. Bloodshed is still a tool that states (and non-state actors) use to manage human society. Even 
in Europe, where the fires of two World Wars during the 20th century originated, violence and 
death have continued. In particular, conflicts in the former Yugoslavia have highlighted concerns 
of war and peace, and strengthened the interest of European governments in building reliable 
structures for post-Cold War security. 
The new European order is more complicated, more vulnerable and less cohesive than during 
the Cold War. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the willingness Europe to accept U.S. 
leadership on security issues might have been expected to decline. Over the past five years, however, 
the leaders of many European states have emphasized the necessity of preserving the U.S. political 
and military presence in Europe, and have argued that there is not yet a viable alternative structure 
for European security. While the threat of two-block confrontation has diminished, new dangers 
have emerged in the wake of communism. These threats and uncertainties have led Central and East 
European states to apply for NATO membership. Yet, the breakdown of the Soviet Union and 
Warsaw Pact has raised a number of questions about the future ties between Western Europe and 
the United States, particularly in light of the development of the European Union after Maastricht. 
Concerns also exist over the possible consequences ofNATO enlargement for relations between 
Russia and the West. More broadly, the international environment in which European - American 
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relations evolve will exert enormous influence over how each actor behaves towards the others. 
From the U.S. perspective, 47 years of the participation in NATO has left a legacy of close 
military and political engagement in Europe. Moreover, as NATO Supreme Allied Commander in 
Europe (SACEUR) General Gorge Joulwan reminded the U.S. Congress, the existence ofNATO 
provides the US European Command (USECOM) with basing, infrastructure and prepositioned 
equipment that have proven essential in several post-Cold War contingencies, and were 
indispensable during the 1991 GulfWar.2 
From the perspective ofEurope, however, the evolution ofNATO in the post-Cold War era 
-- and the broader structure ofEuropean security -- have become extraordinarily controversial topics. 
The Alliance will become undoubtedly remain a decisive component ofEuropean security into the 
next millennium. But membership in a modernized NATO will entail not only security benefits, but 
political, economic, military and social obligations. The enlargement of the Organization will oblige 
both sides - old members and new-- to sacrifice some of their own interests to the new system of 
international security. 
The purpose of this work is to examine how the United States has approached these issues 
concerning NATO enlargement, and how the disparate organizations involved in U.S. security 
decisionmaking are likely to shape U.S. policy in the future. Each government conducts its politics, 
internal and external, in accordance with the national interests defined by the leadership of the 
2 See "European Theater Remains One of Conflict and Transition", statement of Gen. 
George A. Joulwan, USA, Commander-in-Chief, US European Command, to the House National 
Security Committee, March 2, 1995, in Defense Issues (Washington DC: American Forces 
Information Service, Office of the Assistant tant to the Secretary ofDefense, March 1995), 
Vol.IO, no.40, p. 7. 
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country. But the effort to determine this national interest-- especially on an issue as complex as 
NATO enlargement -- is itself a highly political process. Indeed, the structure of the decisionmaking 
process (including the distribution of policy roles and functions) is critical to the outcome ofU.S. 
policy. The aim of my research is to describe the mechanism that determines U.S. security policy, 
particularly as it concerns NATO enlargement. My special interest is to clarify the key points of 
security decisionmaking within the nation and to illuminate the critical components of this process. 
Such an analysis will allow me to define the main characteristics and tendencies of the U.S. 
decisionmaking process and their influence on future U.S. policies toward European security. 
This work argues that enlargement of NATO corresponds to the United States' underlying 
strategic interests in Europe. By taking the leading role in NATO's structural changes, the U.S. 
government has provided a reliable basis for its continued influence in the international European 
state system. The end of the Cold War has made this continued role all the more important for U.S. 
security. Whereas the bipolar international system simplified and necessitated U.S.-European 
cooperation, multipolarity has tended to complicate and add new security pressures to multilateral 
relations. These new pressures have made multilateral security organizations especially valuable, 
and have helped frame the U.S. debate over the relative costs and benefits ofNATO enlargement. 
My argument differs from those offered by many other scholars who have examined the U.S. 
decsionmaking process on NATO enlargement. Jeremy Rosner, Richard Pipes and other prominent 
scholars predict that NATO enlargement will create serious disputes within the U.S. government in 
the near future. In particular, these analysts predict that significant opposition will emerge in the 
United States Senate against ratification of treaties for NATO enlargement. They have also 
expressed concern over the budgetary impact of NATO enlargement, and the effects of this 
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enlargement on relations with Russia. 
My conclusion is very different. NATO enlargement is bound to spur vigorous debate within 
the U.S. government. Nevertheless, the recent history of U.S. decsionmaking on the Alliance 
suggests that U.S. security interests (as they are defined through the U.S. decisionmaking process) 
will continue to encourage support for NATO enlargement. 
A. STRUCTURE OF THESIS. 
My thesis consists of four main sections. The next chapter outlines the domestic political 
structures that shape U.S. security policy . This chapter clarifies the power relationships and 
decisionmaking roles played by the key officials and institutions of the state. This analysis sets the 
stage for the study ofNATO enlargement- related questions of American foreign policymaking that 
comprise the focus of this thesis. 
Chapter III examines the external pressures on U.S. foreign decisionmaking that stem from 
European politics. This chapter examines U.S. interests in Europe in the post-Cold War era, and the 
potential threats to these interests. I analyze why the U.S. has retained such an important role in the 
Old World and examine the implications for NATO enlargement. 
Finally, Chapter IV is based on previous studies and examines the main tendencies ofthe 
U.S. foreign policies toward NATO enlargement. The method of research is a content-analysis of 
recent publications and statements by key American politicians who have had a decisive impact on 
the decisionmaking process. The selection of these officials was done in accordance with the results 
of Chapter II. From this study ofthe internal process ofpolicymaking and from the description of 
external circumstances, it will be possible to focus on a number of trends in the national 
4 
policymaking process, which will directly effect the U.S. policy toward East European states in the 
context of the NATO enlargement process. 
5 
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II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS IN THE 
UNITED STATES. 
This chapter is devoted to a contentious area of American political studies - the United 
States national security policymaking process. Scholars have offered widely differing explanations 
for the determinants of U.S. behavior on security policy, reflecting in part their disagreements over 
the proper level of analysis to bu used. These levels range from the characteristics of individual 
policymakers, to the structure ofthe state's policymaking system, to the pressures and constraints 
exerted on the state by the international system as a whole. 
This study focuses on the structure of the U.S. decisionmaking system, and the effect that 
this structure has on the definition of the national interests in issues such as NATO enlargement. 
The unit of analysis is the process of interaction between governmental and other state 
organizational bodies, which have the impact on the United States foreign and domestic policies. 
There are a lot of different scholars, schemes, structures, patterns, and assumptions involved in the 
American decisionmaking system on national security. The most popular and traditional models are: 
"the concentric circle approach", the "elite and participatory" models, the "system-analysis approach 
to policymaking", and "policy power clusters"3 • Each of these approaches explains to some extent 
the variety of political actors and their interactions, and attempts to predict the relative importance 
of various actors (including the president and Congress) on security policy. For example, the 
"concentric circle" model assumes that the president is at the center of security decisionmaking. 
3 For a detailed description see Sam Sarkesian, "U.S. national security ",Lynne Reinner 
Publishers, 1989, pp. 13-19. 
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Congress, the general population, and the mass media have significant roles in this process, but are 
less significant. Yet, they are not the "key points" of policy making. Still wider circles involve other 
governmental structures and agencies, constituencies and interest groups. The further from the 
center, the less their importance as "players" in national security policymaking. 
My argument is different. While the structure of the U.S. decisiorunaking system is fairly 
constant, the distribution of power and influence on a given issue will vary with the nature of that 
issue ant the sorts of interests that it engages. Issues also have differing levels of different level of 
immediacy and political significance. The level of seriousness could place an issue into either 
"routine" or "priority" categories. Routine questions usually take more time and involve a couple 
of power rings. "Priority" questions are usually resolved in a comparatively short period of time and 
only by the President and his closest advisers. 
NATO-related issues involve both immediate and long-term concerns. In the case of NATO 
enlargement, the crucial point of policymaking is the balance between domestic political and 
external interests in shaping security policy. This balance has shifted since President Clinton came 
into office four years ago. While domestic frustration and some foreign policy success have 
reminded President Clinton's administration that world leadership can be politically useful, the 
country's long-term policy priorities have also changed. In this chapter, I will explain how the nature 
of the issues raised by NATO enlargement help determine the influence exercised by Clinton 
Administration officials, legislators and other actors, given the larger political context in which U.S. 
deciorunaking takes place. 
It is impossible to analyze in detail the entire system of U.S. national security 
decisionmaking of a highly developed democracy within such a comparatively briefthesis. Yet, on 
8 
the issue ofNATO enlargement, the basic allocation ofpolicymaking roles in the U.S. Constitution 
will play a key role in shaping U.S. behavior. I will also assess the political and institutional 
interests of specific U.S. actors that may affect their attitudes toward NATO enlargement. In 
particular, the difference of interests between the U.S. State Department and the Department of 
Defense are critical to understanding the future American role in Europe. 
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR SECURITY POLICYMAKING. 
In terms of foreign policymaking, the U.S. political system can not be presented as a 
monolithic entity. The entire structure consists of components with different powers, authorities, 
interests, and perceptions of the nation's priorities. Indeed, a key feature of the constitutional 
frameworks for decisionmaking on issues such as NATO enlargement is the decentralization of 
power4• The framers of the Constitution structured the state to diffuse political power throughout 
its political system. The principle of separated powers modifies basic characteristics of interactions 
between the legislative and executive branches of the government. Each ofthese branches shares 
security policymaking responsibilities with the other. This principle triggers each side to check the 
other and to be checked by it. As one of the nation's founders James Madison argued, this system 
of interlocking powers distributed among separated branches of the government was essential to the 
preservation of liberty. Inside the branches of state power "Ambitions must be made to counteract 
ambition so as to prevent arbitrary acts ofthe government."5 
4 This definition have been taken from G. Edvards and W. Walker "National Security 
and the US. Constitution", The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988. 
5 James Madison, Federalist, no. 51 
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The Constitution gives the President a few specific security policy powers that relate directly 
to NATO enlargement and the use of forces in a NATO context. These powers include his role as 
Commander in Chief, his authority to negotiate treaties (such as for NATO enlargement), and to 
nominate Ambassadors and other executive branch officials. Article 2, Sections 2 and 3 of the 
Constitution of the United States of America reads: 
" The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United 
States, and of the Militia of the several states, when called into the actual Service of the 
United States; he may require the Opinion in writing, of the principal officer in each of 
the executive departments, upon any subject, relating to the Duties of their respective 
Offices, and he shall have power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Officers against 
the United States, except in Cases oflmpeachment. 
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make 
Treaties, provided two-thirds ofthe Senators present concur .... 6 
" ... he (the President) shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall 
take Care that the Law be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of 
the United States." 
At the same time, few of the President's powers can be exercised effectively without 
Congress' affirmation. With regards to warmaking, Congress has the power" to declare war,"" to 
raise and support armies," and to "provide for the common defense". The president can negotiate 
treaties such as those that will provide for NATO enlargement, but those treaties are can only be 
ratified Provided that " two thirds of the Senator present concur." The president can appoint 
ambassadors only "by and with advice and consent of the Senate"7. The precept of separation of 
powers requires the President to act only with the acquiescence of the Congress. Moreover, any 
decision which causes financial spending must be authorized and appropriated by Congress. NATO 
6 The Constitution of the United States of America 
7 The Constitution of the United States of America, Article 2, Section 2. 
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enlargement is bound to involve new spending requirements; hence, on this issue as well, the 
Constitution ensures that decisionmaking will be shared by Congress and the president. 
The separation of powers has its impact also on the political influence of institutions outside 
of government, such as political parties, public organizations, and other interest groups. The access 
among multiple influential elites or interested groups to influencing policymaking is one of the 
peculiarities of American political system. The multipolar and competitive nature of political 
interests in the political process is caused by restricted authority in the structure of the national 
government. In the case ofNATO enlargement, I will argue in the final chapter that interests groups 
such as (Polish Americans) have played a significant role in shaping U.S. policy. A related feature 
of the American constitutional system is the "vertical decentralization of power," which is created 
by federalism as a fundamental base of national security decisionmaking. The result of federalism 
is the tendency of legislators to be especially concerned for the interests of their constituencies. 
Given this wide distribution and sharing of powers, then, issues such as NATO enlargement 
are bound to be the focus of competition for influence between the president and Congress. As noted 
by Edward S. Corwin, the Constitution has really provided "an invitation to struggle for the privilege 
of directing American foreign policy."8 This will be true of the issues surrounding NATO 
enlargement as well. By giving both branches the power to share responsibilities, the Constitution 
requires the two branches two work together to define U.S. security priorities. 
8 EdwardS. Corwin, The President Office and Powers 1787-1957, NewYork University 
Press, 1957, p.l71 
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B. POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 
In the realm of implementing security policy, Congress plays a decisive role. The core power 
of the Congress in security decisionmaking is to make laws and appropriate funds. Treaty-making 
power rests in the Senate, whose advice and consent (by two-thirds vote) is necessary before the 
President can enter into a treaty with another country. In controlling the budget, the Congress has 
a prime opportunity to subordinate the president's initiatives to congressional priorities (and to the 
interests of its constituents). Despite the fact that the Congress has the power to declare war, raise 
and support armies, maintain and supply a Navy, make regulations for land and naval military 
forces, make sets of rules for the government, ratify treaties, confirm ambassadors and regulate 
foreign commerce, legislators ordinarily use these powers to determine whether and how to 
implement presidential initiatives (rather than launching such initiatives themselves). Because of its 
multiplicity and size, it is difficult for Congress to formulate strategies for national security. Each 
member of Congress represents his (or her) constituents and his ( or her) goal is to satisfy them. 
Many members of Congress represent and protect interests of economic and financial elites. These 
politicians can also be sensitive to the pressures from interest groups or lobbyists. Contradictions 
between these narrow interests can become especially sharp in cases when the interests of the nation 
are different than the interests of particular congressional constituencies. 
The distribution of power inside the Congress on issues such as NATO enlargement depends 
on a mixture of numerous variables: the responsibilities· of particular committees over relevant 
legislation, the power and interests of particular members, and the position of the leadership in the 
House and Senate. Members of Congress depend on their constituencies to get elected, but they 
also depend on their colleagues to shape the final outcome of any activity. In the ideal scheme the 
12 
interaction of these interests should drive adversarial groups to compromise their positions and 
eventually to reach a consensus. In this scheme the separation of power internal to Congress is 
important to the whole legislative process. Moreover, the "sword ofDamocles" for each member 
of Congress is a risk of losing reelection9 • Therefore, in examining questions such as NATO 
enlargement, the effect of individual electoral concerns on congressional behavior can be of critical 
importance. 
Yet, much of the work of Congress is done by committees, which have their own 
decsionmaking dynamics. At the start of the legislative process, bills dealing with such NATO 
enlargement-related issues must go through the appropriate committees and subcommittees, which 
led are by chairmen appointed by the majority party in each house. Both the Foreign Relations and 
Foreign Affairs committees occupy a pivotal place within congressional foreign policy 
decisionmaking. The main legislative task of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is to draft 
foreign aid authorization bills for the Senate and to deal with treaties negotiated by the president. 
Despite the formal responsibility these committees on defense-related, in real life their political 
influence has declined in recent years relative to other key committees (especially the Senate Armed 
Services Committee). But no matter which committee takes the lead on treaty ratification issues, the 
Senate as a whole can play a decisive role in security policymaking through this mechanism. The 
Senate has the power to block the ratification of a treaty. In the past 200 years 90.1% of all treaties 
were approved by the Senate and 9.9% were blocked. The Senate refused to consider 118 treaties, 
and 88 of them were subsequently withdrawn. The Senate can modify a treaty through amendments, 
9 Being alone or within the group of congressmen. 
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reservations and understandings. The Senate can also kill treaties by adding unacceptable 
stipulations, which it has done in more than 40 cases. 10 This raises broader issues critical to NATO 
enlargement: that is, the balance of power between Congress and the president over security policy, 
and the structure of the Executive Branch in dealing with such issues. 
C. CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH 
In order to understand the balance of power between the President and the Congress, it is 
principal to note two key differences between them. First, the entire institution of the presidency is 
incarnate in one person, while in Congress it is difficult to assign responsibility to any one particular 
member. Consequently, individuals in Congress have much more flexibility and room to maneuver. 
The President, on the other hand, as leader of the state, must predict the foreseeable future in his 
activities. A second difference lies in their respective constituencies. The President's constituency 
is the whole nation, he is elected to be a nation's governor. Members of Congress (even senators) 
represent just fractions of the total population, including restricted communities or interest groups. 
These differences create implications for the balance of power in real political life. 
In the executive branch, power is concentrated in one person, who must be able to define the 
priorities of national interests at a highest executive level. The president is the Chief of State, Chief 
Executive, Commander-in-Chief, Chief Diplomat, Chief Legislator, and Party Chief As the 
officially elected leader of the state, the president is responsible for setting the long-range goals of 
10 See more in James McCormick, "American Foreign Policy and Process" Ch. 7, 
pp.275- 278 
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the nation and simultaneously selecting the appropriate methods to achieve them. In this structure, 
the President's role is to select appropriate ideas and programs, adopt and develop them and try to 
meet the nation's priorities through budget provisions. Another peculiarity of the presidency is the 
capacity the President has to select his staff and name them to the top positions of executive bodies. 
He must trust them enough to work out ideas and programs and later implement them. In fact, these 
people compose a close ring of power around the President, which creates and conducts national 
security policy. This is the President's team. In the framework of the present study it should be 
emphasized that the President's power is based in the main executive institutions - his 
Administration, the National Security Council, the Department of State, the Department of Defense 
and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 
In addition to the top appointees who lead the key state departments, the President needs to 
have his special staff who will create, process and implement security policies. This function used 
to be carried out by the Cabinet of secretaries. Now this function is fulfilled by the President's 
Administration (the second ring of power) and the National Security Council (NSC). But he must 
penetrate his administration by the view of the world. If the president is to be successful, his own 
style must dominate security policymaking. If he can not do this, security policies will affected by 
the contradictions between internal political actors. 
One remark important to understanding the process should be made at this point. Each of the 
executive departments and other state agencies has its own specific interests because of budget 
financing, formulation and spending for its own programs, the level of their influence in the 
decisionmaking, the amount of real power in these institutions. Actually, this narrow interests supply 
a balance of power within the team by the heads and principals of these institutions and agencies. 
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They support the President by ideas and initiatives and their improvement and implementation. At 
the same time the principal authorities represent the interests of their own departments. Sooner or 
later, each of these appointees realizes that he has to defend and advocate his department's 
preferences. After all, implementation of any kind of policy by a particular branch can not be 
universal and unchanged. Each department seeks autonomy and wishes to be as independent as 
possible. The importance of this tendency will be illustrated in the example of the NATO-related 
questions in the last chapter. 
While balancing domestic priorities and his foreign politics, the President may be able to 
realize his foreign strategy through relationships with world leaders, the treaties his administration 
negotiates, and representatives selected and appointed by him all over the world. In times of trouble 
outside the U.S., the President must be able to deal with a crisis quickly and effectively. Former 
President G. Ford, for instance, endorsed the view that the Congress is too large and too diverse 
to handle foreign policy crises11 • But the national security establishment of the executive branch 
itself is enormously diverse and complex. 
D. THE NATIONAL SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT 
The present structure of the national security system was established under the National 
Security Act of1947 and adopted by Congress in 1949 and 1958. In accordance with this law, the 
11 On the another hand, G. FORD summarized his views on Congress after leaving office: 
"Congress has gone too far [in recent years] in many areas in trying to assume powers that 
belong to the president and the executive brunch." Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf, 
"American Foreign Policy, Pattern and Process", Second edition, St. Martin's Press, New 
York, 1882, p.399 
16 
National Security Council (NSC), a position of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS), the U.S. Air Force, and the Central Intelligence Agency were created. The purpose of the 
NSC is to "advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military 
policies relating to the national security." The National Security Council consists of the President, 
Vice-President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. The Director of the CIA and the 
Chairman of the JCS are advisors. Other NSC advisers and assistants include the Secretary of 
Treasury, the Attorney General, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 
heads of governmental organizations such as the International Communication Agency (ICA), the 
Agency for International Development (AID), and other leaders of state organizations. 
Regarding the Department ofDefense, the 1947 Act established the position of the Secretary 
of Defense with the main responsibility of overseeing the national military establishment, formally 
headed by three cabinet-level officers of three separate departments: the Army, Navy, and Air Force 
(the Service Departments).The 1949 Amendments to the National Security Act abolished the Service 
Departments as separate entities and merged them into an enlarged Department of Defense. The 
Secretary of Defense was given full control over the whole Department, and the Office of the 
Secretary ofDefense (OSD) was established to assist him. In addition, a new position, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), was created to precede over JCS meetings. Congress set two 
important limits on the extent of unification. The Services were to be administrated separately, and 
the Chairman of the JCS was not required to give independent advice to the Secretary ofDefense, 
but had to act essentially as the spokesman of the JCS. In 1953 President Eisenhower increased the 
powers of the Secretary ofDefense and the Chairman of the JCS. But in 1958 he found it necessary 
to invite Congress to agree to additional steps toward a completely unified Department. He stated: 
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" ... the tendency toward service rivalry and controversy which has so deeply troubled the American 
people will be sharply reduced."12 Congress accepted the President's proposals, which gave the 
Secretary of Defense greater flexibility in the management of defense funds and enhanced control 
over research and development. The last step in the development of the internal structure of the 
Department of Defense was taken by the Goldwater-Nicols Bill in 1986 which was aimed at 
strengthening the position of the Commander of the JCS and which established the position of an 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflicts. 
Each of the members of the NSC is responsible for fulfilling his functions of the national 
security decision-making process: collecting and providing information, identifying issues, 
formulating, analyzing, and evaluating alternatives; making decisions (within certain parameters), 
and implementing policy. Each who at the center of decisionmaking is in the inner circle, while 
organizations still provide necessary information (includingthe results of their own processing) and 
must be relied upon to implement the policy. 
The President can use the NSC as much as he considers it necessary. It is important to note 
that by law the NSC has only an advisory capacity. Any assumptions, conclusions or decisions 
made by the members of the NSC will be presented to the President as advice. Being the highest 
formal mechanism of security consultations, it is useful for all presidents in taking on it such 
problems as: collecting of information, identifying problems, dealing with crises, making 
preliminary decisions, and proof their reasonability, coordinating efforts and actions, and structure 
of agencies. 
12 President Eisenhower's message to Congress on April3, 1958., Documents on 
establishment and Organization 1944-1978, Washington D.C., Department ofDefense, 1978. 
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The role and function of the National Security Assistant to the President have become much 
more weighty than just policy advising and coordinating. A lot of political analysts have taken the 
position that people such as Kissinger and Brzezinski, when they held their positions, overran the 
powers and the role of the Secretary of State. One of the main responsibilities of the National 
Security Adviser's position is to supply the President with objective and unbiased information. To 
a large extent the personality of the Adviser, his access to the President and the level of trust, 
provide him room for flexibility in national security decisionmaking. The Assistant is also 
completely the President's man, appointed without the approval of Congress. The NSC also has a 
comparatively small but highly coordinated staff The structure of three- or four- persons divisions, 
formed on a geographic (or special issue) basis provides a high level of mobility and immunity, and 
interagency cooperation. It includes mid- and upper-level authorities and experts, and summarizes 
all available information for PCCs. 
The NSC is the most unpublicized but most influential institution in the U.S. decisionmaking 
process. This body is at the top ofthe American security decisionmaking pyramid. In fact, the NSC 
is a state within a state (or government within the government). The example ofthe "Iran-Contras" 
case evidently pursued that the NSC's staff de-facto had become a significant part of 
decisionmaking and the policy-implementing establishment. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Given that the Constitution creates an "invitation to struggle" over the control of security 
policy, the question of which institutions will control NATO enlargement decisions is far from clear-
cut. Both Congress and the president have important powers in this regard. Moreover, within the 
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executive branch itself, large numbers of organizations have at least some authority over security 
policy. But the office of the President remains a central point of the decisionmaking process. The 
formulation and implementation of policy on the scale ofNATO enlargement would seem to require 
the coordinated effort that the executive branch is best suited to provide. How have executive 
branch officials actually shaped policies concerning post-Cold War Europe since the collapse of the 
cold War, and dealt with the security interests and concerns ofEuropean nations? 
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ID. THE INTERSECTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND EASTERN EUROPEAN 
NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE NATO ENLARGEMENT PROCESS. 
A state's behavior is driven not only by the structure of its decisionmaking process, but by 
the pressures of the outside world. The United States as well as the European powers are both 
interested in a strong and stable security system, economic interdependence and the preservation of 
adequate military capabilities. This chapter will argue that continued U.S. presence in Europe is an 
important prerequisite for European security. In the present balance of power in the Old World, each 
one of the key political actors - the Western European, East and Central European states, and the 
United States itself-- has its own national interests in the strengthening of transatlantic cooperation. 
The intersection of these interests is a crucial factor for the future of post-Cold 
War security structures. Simultaneously, this situation is advantageous for the U.S. in terms of its 
own broader objectives in the region, especially for preserving its influence among European powers 
on security and economic issues. 
A. EUROPEAN POLITICS 
1. European Democracies'Goals of NATO Membership 
The new Eastern European states are facing the vital question of how to rebuild their national 
economic systems, and integrate into the world market economy system. In this context, questions 
of national security have become vitally important for the development of democracy, and for the 
economic, political, social reconstruction of the new states. The fear of a revitalized superpower 
"from the East" has forced newly independent states to give priority to finding effective and 
constructive guarantees of their sovereignty and independence. Furthermore, the geostrategic 
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position ofEuropean states gives them special concerns for their security. Former members of the 
Warsaw Pact find themselves squeezed between Russia (with its potential political instabilities) and 
effective and highly organized political-military Alliance from the West. The task of avoiding 
"being in the buffer zone" 13 between two still antagonistic blocs has become the main strategic 
priority of the Eastern and Central European states. 
2. The Framework for a New Alliance 
In accordance with basic agreements, the changed agenda for Europe will include: 1-
stabilization of European security based on the construction and development of democratic 
institutions and the peaceful resolution of all problems; 2- maintaining sufficient transatlantic links 
for negotiations on national interests of both sides; 3- efficient interdependence for containment and 
prevention of all kinds of aggression; 4- the maintaining of the strategic balance within Europe. All 
four items are related to the United States' nuclear umbrella over NATO partners. 
At this point it should be stated that the possible use of nuclear weapons still poses one of 
the most serious threats to international security. The character of this threat is somewhat different 
than it was during the period of the U.S.- Soviet stand-off Any careful analysis of current bilateral 
or multilateral international relations will suggest the continuing presence of the nuclear shadow. 
This problem includes other aspects: nuclear weapons of European states, nuclear 
armaments' size and balance, the nuclear shadow ofthe U.S. membership in NATO, the nuclear 
13 This title defines a part of Eastern and Central Europe in the context of the post Cold 
War security. In political discussions and statements there were some other names given to this 
region - " the zone of security vacuum ", " the buffer zone between former rivalries " and 
recently - " the grey zone of insecurity ". 
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umbrella over the new (or potential) members of the enlarged Alliance, and finally, the problem of 
potential nuclearization of Germany. 
Since the end of World War II the American presence in Europe was essential to the 
provision of superpower protection of Western European countries against the "spread of 
communism". The vital structural element of this counterbalance of superpowers was "the American 
nuclear umbrella over Europe". In strategic terms this umbrella was more a political than military 
argument. It allowed Britain and France to produce conventional and other non-nuclear kinds of 
forces. Germany also shared in this guarantee, but was not allowed to develop its own nuclear 
capabilities, as will shown below. 
3. The "German Problem" in the New Europe 
It would be useful at this point to concentrate on the role of the "German factor'' in a changed 
Europe. The whole history ofNATO is strongly linked to the resolution of the "German problem" 
without threatening the security of other European nations. Germany, which is structurally and 
industrially more powerful than any another country (except Russia), has long had to be 
accommodated by other regional powers. After the Second World War the main strategy toward 
Germany was its full integration through mutual cooperation and multilateral agreements without 
restriction of any European's state sovereignty. Without this strategy Germany would never have 
been unified in 1990, nor unified as a full member ofNATO. Consequently, it has became clear that 
Germany's integration into NATO and Western Europe would reinforce the status quo in Europe 
and that the NATO structure would provide constructive and cooperative integration of armed forces 
and reasonable denationalization of its defense policies. The unification of Germany without this 
23 
framework would have corrupted the status quo. That is the reason why the Soviet Union agreed to 
the proposition that the reunited Germany would remain a full NATO member. 
Nevertheless, the "German question" remains one of the top considerations in the framework 
of future strategies developed by the Alliance. Some key approaches should be emphasized here. 
The first one is the duality of the geopolitical role of Germany in present circumstances. On the one 
hand, West Germany is integration into the West European community has been credited with 
undermining or preventing revitalized imperial ambitions toward Eastern and Central Europe. On 
the another hand, Western Germany is no longer considered a border zone between the East and 
the West in stand-off meaning. In the new environment it tends to be a link between Eastern and 
Western Europe. 
Other important precondition is that the Post- Second World War period created a strong 
political Alliance between main European states- Britain, France and Germany, which historically 
have not always been friendly. The U.S. participation in NATO and the U.S. presence in the 
European theater should be emphasized in this context as significant factors. These preconditions 
eventually led to the recognition of West Germany's international role in the course of the 1989-
1990 reunification. 
4. New Europe vs. Old Problems 
The purpose of a reconstructed (or enlarged) NATO should be to conduct consultations, 
leading to the achievement of a consensus, and to intervene selectively in conflicts that threaten its 
security interests. Eventually, the whole scenario of transformation aimed the development from 
collective defense to collective security. 
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Today's NATO, with the United States at its center, may be well positioned to fill this role. 
Other states will be attracted by the security of strong relations with the U.S. and its NATO partners. 
This analysis offers grounds deeper than domestic-level. particulars and institutional inertia for 
anticipating a continued appeal ofNATO enlargement amongst former Warsaw Pact states. 
Yet, it is also is obvious that the new NATO will need a new type of decisionmaking format. 
Most analysts predict that the new decisionmaking structure will mainly consist of representation 
of the most powerful states. Other scenarios are also possible, but further decisionmaking will stick 
firmly to NATO's proven way of governing. Any attempt to change the core will cause trouble for 
the old members of the Alliance and will create significant obstacles for the adaptation of new 
members. It is more efficient to improve and revitalize the old system than to construct a new one, 
especially taking into consideration the clarity of the fact that Vishegrad Group members will not 
be the only applicants for NATO membership. 
Another aspect of the problem is that the Western countries initially underestimated the 
fragility of the transformations achieved in the former Warsaw Pact and former Soviet Union. Only 
some politicians understood that what was true in Western Europe after the Second World War 
would be even more true in Central and Eastern Europe after the Cold War: that interdependence 
would have to be rebuilt, not merely respected and security provided, rather than simply assumed. 
Finally, most people in the West overestimated the profundity of the change that took place 
in Russia after 199l.Many acted as ifRussia had experienced a revolution of a classical kind. In fact, 
what she had experienced was a collapse: a collapse that left many of her old power structures sullen 
and demoralized, but intact. To some degree it was a "guided" collapse, instigated not by the 
Soviet's most radical opponents, but by its most radical members. It has taken time for the West to 
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understand that post-Communist Russia is in a murky state and that it has not been entirely 
transformed. 
Then, there is a huge division between the economically integrated countries of the European 
Union (EU), now including Finland and Sweden, and the "others" who would like to become 
members of the EU as soon as possible. The "highway" concept can be applied to the future Europe, 
where some countries move in the very slow right line, while others can drive in the middle one, and 
"luxuries" prefer the left one. The first two can be divided into the economically relatively well-
developed countries of the Vishegrad group and a great number of countries struggling but failing 
to satisfy the basic needs of their populations. They have to change their tactics of becoming 
members of the EU within the foreseeable time frame. 
The economically developed West is unprepared and unwilling to deal with all of these new 
needs in the former Warsaw Pact. Plans for a Marshall plan-type of economic assistance for Eastern 
Europe and Russia by the U.S.(first of all, taking into consideration their world dominance), EU, and 
Germany fueled by a financial transfer from the OECD countries of 0. 5% of their GDP per year, 
have little chance to be realized. As a result, economic frustration adds to the unstable situation in 
some of the Eastern European countries such as my native Ukraine, Romania, Moldova, Byelorussia, 
and Russia. 
Nevertheless, the weight of political initiative has basically been on the side ofthe Western 
European countries. The development of European security structures (and defense identity of single 
states as a precondition of its stable structure) does not only require an institutional framework with 
clear and effective rules of decision-making and similar division of roles, but also on understanding 
and perceiving common social-economic aims. The construction of an economic and monetary 
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union in the European Union needs the complex interdependence. 
The policy makers among the Alliance members ought to respond to the internal problems 
of the candidates for enlargement. Extending NATO to the East raises complex cleavages: minority 
problems among Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania, the difficult geostrategic position of the Baltic 
states with their Russian minorities, and finally the creation of a new direct border with Russia and 
CIS. Clearly, "NATO going East" is not the only component of the overall question of how to 
reshape European security and how NATO perceives its future mission. 
5. Review of the NATO- Oriented Politics 
The Eastern Foreign Minister's meeting on March 17, 1990 could be considered a turning 
point in the history of Modern Europe. At that meeting former Foreign Minister of the USSR 
Shevardnadze claimed that reunified Germany should not be a member ofNATO, but should have 
some kind of special status as a border zone between former hemispheres. Unexpectedly for the 
Soviet delegation, the foreign ministers ofPoland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia did not support this 
view and were considering Germany's membership in NATO as a sure guarantee against a 
resurgence of German nationalism and keeping this country under reliable international control. 
It would be a mistake to imply that the positions of the above mentioned governments 
countries were completely identical. The foreign minister of Poland Krzystof Skybishewski tended 
to consider the North-Atlantic Alliance as sufficient background for further European security. 
Hungarian officials occupied almost the same position. Prague, however, had a propensity for a 
strict pan-European collective security system after the demolition of two-blocks withstanding. The 
main deviation between the concept of European independent collective security and NATO 
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efficiency with its American presence was overcome only in the next 18 months. 14 
The consensus on the question of the importance of the US role in the structure ofEuropean 
security was achieved barely despite Prague's position . The necessity of orienting toward the 
Western Alliance had became an unquestioned feature of the position of these countries. Yet, 
differences in their approaches to the US presence and the "German factor" still remained in that 
period. At the same time the fear that a united Germany might revert to being a regional aggressor 
have been reweighed by obvious profitability of its material and political support. 
In this situation the best possible scenario for European security from the point of view of 
the Eastern European states was their participation in the same political-military Alliance with 
Germany, having the permanent oversight and presence of a state as strong as the U.S. 
European alliances were not eager to support the aspirations of the new European neighbors. 
The main argument of their discretion was stated as a danger of poisoned relations with Russia. They 
adhere to the position to postpone the adoption of new states until full arrangement of this question 
with Russia so as to avoid alienation of this state. 
The next period in the Post-Cold War interdependence settlement started in 1993 when the 
official Russian position toward NATO enlargement and European security appeared. Russian 
military doctrine ofNovember 13, 199315 and Mr. Primakov's statement on Russian policy toward 
NAT016 were considered as putting into doubt previous rapprochement toward Europe. 
Simultaneously Moscow had begun a variety of activities to rearrange Russian domination in the 
14 Alfred A. Reisch., Cultural and Eastern Europe's Quest for NATO membership, 
RFEIRL Research report, July 9, 1993. Pp.33-47. 
15 The newspaper "Krasnaya Zvezda", November 19, 1993 pp.1-2. 
16 The newspaper "Izvestia", November 26, 1993 p.1 
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regions of the former Soviet Union. Furthermore, the tensions in the Baltic states caused by the 
continuing military presence ofRussian forces tended to remind the bitter experience ofthe Soviet 
Foreign policy in the Eastern European states in 1956 and 1968. The last fear was a concern about 
the possibility of internal military conflict within the former USSR The pattern of Russian-
Ukrainian relations of that period could explain the nature of the latter concerns. First, Russia was 
over-reacting in the field of former Soviet nuclear weapon on Ukrainian territory. Second, the 
problem of the Black Sea Fleet was a preeminent issue, since it actually reflected Russian territorial 
claims to the Crimean Peninsula (which are still exist!). 
Finally, it became obvious that Russia wanted to prevent the Central and East European 
countries from becoming Alliance members, precisely because they could no longer be seen as a 
Russian security zone or "a zone of special Russian interest." At present, Russia does not accept the 
possible stationing of foreign (NATO) troops in these countries. Such a deployment would deepen 
the Russian sense of isolation and hinder the difficult way to extremely important reforms in security 
policy and the armed forces. The result could be a further militarization of Russian foreign and 
security policy. 
It seems doubtful that these security problems will be resolved in the near future. Different 
security concepts and approaches are required. At the present time both are lacking. In addition to 
the Russian-factor, the" go-slow approach" of NATO reflects the understandable reluctance of the 
U.S. and European allies to take on new security commitments. This is certainly true for Germany. 
But ifNATO should be extended, the Vishegrad countries will probably be included, together with 
security agreements with Russia and closer political cooperation within NATO, leaving out the 
Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldova and the Baltic States. Furthermore, Europe remains divided into a 
29 
region of"assured security" and a region outside these security structures. 
Another important external consideration in shaping policy on NATO enlargement stems 
form the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Central European nations grew concerned that that they 
would be victimized by Serbian aggression ifRussia kept control over Belgrade's political direction. 
The officials in Budapest and in other neighboring states felt the danger of Serbian aggression 
(either in direct form or through nonmilitary confrontation). In particular, it was feared that "ethnic 
cleansing" which had taken place in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, might extend to the 
Hungarians of the Serbian territory of Vojovodina. Weak and "unprotected " Central Europeans 
tended to interpret the situation as the Western ability and willingness to protect only Alliance 
members. As a result, the new players of the European policy started to consider NATO 
membership as essential for their national security and political independence. It was impossible to 
revitalize pre-Second World War Europe. A new security structure had to be built. 
B. TRANSATLANTIC LINKS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY 
After World War IT the United States adopted the strategy of containment against the USSR. 
The cornerstone ofU.S. security strategy persisted throughout the Cold War, including the first years 
of the Bush Administration. As the Cold War began to disappear, however, the Bush Administration 
adopted a political concept to serve as a bridge between the Cold War period and the Post Cold War 
era. The official title of this concept is "the New World Order"(NWO). While there is no precise 
official definition of this term, the NWO did have a number ofbroad characteristics. 
The most important feature of the NWO's concept for security planning was the persistence 
of U.S. dominance in the world, politically and economically. Secondly, the American military 
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capability was to be the decisive means for peacemaking, peacekeeping and the prevention of any 
sort of aggression in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. The NWO concept emphasized that all 
questions and problems between nations should be resolved by non-violent means. Simultaneously, 
the United Nations would increase its role as a mediator and peacekeeper. The next feature of that 
concept was the enhancement of economic cooperation and the interdependence of market-oriented 
economic systems. The fifth characteristic was the expectation that Eurasian non-democratic or 
semi-democratic states would orient their security policies toward NATO. The NWO also postulated 
a high level of cooperation between "great" powers on most important international issues. 
The NWO reflected the realities of Post-Communist Europe, including an interdependent 
Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany. It also kept a cautious eye on the changes in the 
former Soviet Union. For the future ofNATO, however, the most important factor in reshaping U.S. 
strategy was the raise of ethnonationalist tensions and conflicts across Europe. The unexpected 
consequence of the breakdown of the bipolar system was the "fragmentation'' of Europe instead of 
desirable "integration".17 From 1990 to 1993 the United States was interested in leading the debate 
on using NATO military forces in a Yugoslavia settlement. Furthermore, the CSCE was unable to 
take any enforcement action because of the absence of institutional structure and efficient procedure. 
The WEU at that time did not have enough experience in dealing with "sensitive" issues of the 
European security. All this raised the obvious appeal ofNATO involvement. Why NATO? It was 
the only organization which remained with well equipped, well structured, and well trained military 
forces. Indeed, NATO has became the only major security institution that survived the years of the 
17 John Lewis Gaddis, "Toward the Post-Cold War World", Foreign A.ffaires, 70/1 
(Spring) 1991, pp. 102-122. 
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Cold War and continues to create European stability. 
The CSCE and WEU's inability to resolve the Yugoslavian conflict increased the role of 
NATO's military power as well as the fact of American leadership within the Alliance and in 
Europe in the foreseeable future. President Bush argued that: 
The New World Order is not a fact; it is an inspiration, an opportunity. We have within our 
grasp an extraordinary possibility that few generations have enjoyed - to build a new 
international system in accordance with our own values and ideals, as old patterns and 
certainties crumble around us. 18 
This approach became the conceptual background for the President's Clinton's European 
policies. The security strategy of President Clinton's Administration in Europe focused on U.S. 
interests in two dimensions: 1) rethinking NATO's missions in Europe; and 2) increasing NATO's 
role in collective security in the region. The revitalization of the North Atlantic Alliance after the 
end of the Cold War has become strategically vital in terms of security, economic and defense 
settlements within the Western Alliances. In 1993, Germany, France and Belgium have, with the 
creation of Eurocorps, begun the process of what could evolve to be the core defense projection 
capability of the European Union (EU). France and Germany are, meanwhile, cooperating on a 
wider range of defense industrial projects. The Clinton Administration itself, unsure about the future 
role ofNATO, has hinted at a new cooperative arrangement with non-NATO European states plus 
former Soviet states which would serve as a second-tier (or qualifying organization) for possible 
future entry into Alliance. The gesture addresses U.S. diplomacy needed to accommodate the non-
NATO states, but failed to develop a strategic rationale for the wider organization, other than the 
18 National Security Strategy of the United States, 1993, Preface. 
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normal diplomatic need to sustain peaceful communication.19 Now, the challenge confronting the 
Clinton Administration is how to proceed on the questions ofNATO enlargement-- both for the 
countries hoping to gain entry in the near term, and those that are concerned about being "left 
behind" as part of a buffer region. In this regard, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) 
remaining a considerable political and secure base for Eastern and Central European states because: 
1- it provides trans-Atlantic links which are the cornerstone of the security guarantees to the 
East European states (more psychological than actual). 
2- it has already enhanced security cooperation in Eastern Europe. In the another words, it 
has uniting rather then dividing influence in Europe. 
3- the recent policies have become more Pan-European by traditionally neutral states such 
as Austria, Finland and Sweden. 
Furthermore, NACC is closely tied operationally to WEU and has actively moved into peacekeeping 
activity. 
From the point of view of its strategic interests in Europe and NATO, and bearing in mind 
the traditional practice of strategic access to particular areas through the military and security 
agreements with weaker states, U.S. policy will likely be shaped by the following concerns and 
objectives: 
1- the U.S. military presence and security/political commitments will provide for the 
psychological and actual security of the Vishegrad Group's members, making NATO/NACC the 
security institutions of choice. 
2- preserving a structure of interdependent European institutions, rather competitive 
19 See more in editorial article, Defense and Foreign Affaires, Oct/Now. 1993 
33 
relationships between security blocks, will best preserve U.S. and European security interests. For 
this purpose the United States should be sure that relationships between the U.S. and the EU as well 
as between WEU and NATO will remain cooperative. In this context the US will probably recognize 
the necessity ofthe WEU's observer status in the NACC. 
3- the U.S. is interested in the improvement of cooperation within the Vishegrad Group to 
ameliorate the considerable differences between individual states in political, economic and military 
spheres. Otherwise, these differences will create hurdles to NATO enlargement. 
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IV. THE U.S. APPROACH TO NATO ENLARGEMENT 
A. FORMATION AND ADOPTION OF THE US POLICY TOWARD EASTERN 
EUROPE 
Participation in European international relations has been a principal focus of American 
foreign policy in this century. The United States has sent military forces to Europe three times to 
prevent a single European power from dominating the region: imperial Germany in World War I, 
Nazi Germany in World War II, and the containment of the Soviet Union in the Cold War. More 
recently, US forces have been committed to help resolve the military conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia. 
The doctrine of the Clinton Administration governing future of U.S. participation in 
European security is still evolving. The main dimensions of this doctrine were laid out in the 
President's speech in Brussels in January, 1994. He stated 
" I come to Europe to help strengthen European integration, to create a new security for the 
United States and its Atlantic partners, based on the idea that we have a real chance to 
integrate rather than divide Europe, both East and West, an integration based on shared 
democracies, market economies and defense cooperation."20 
At that summit the "Partnership for Peace" program (PFP) was proposed and adopted. The 
implementation of this program has become a decisive driving force in the formation of the new 
security order in the European region. The "PFP" program, which was originally created by 
Pentagon analysts and proposed for the consideration of the President by the Secretary ofDefense 
20 The President's News Conference in Brussels, January 10, 1994, Weekly Compilation 
ofPresidential Documents, Vol. 30-No 2, January 17, 1994, pp. 23-24. 
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W. Perrf\ has provided a solid foundation background for military as well as political cooperation 
in previously divided Europe. 
The essence of the present U.S. national security concept toward NATO and "PFP" was 
stated by the Secretary of Defense in his message to the President and the Congress: 
"In Europe NATO is the foundation of our security strategy, and we continue to play a 
leadership role within NATO .... NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) program is already 
extending a zone of stability eastward across Europe and Central Asia by promoting 
military cooperation among NATO countries, former members of the Warsaw Pact, and 
other countries of the region ... .In fact, the positive effects ofPFP resonate far beyond the 
security sphere. Since political and economic issues are a prerequisite to participation in 
PFP or membership in NATO, many Partner nations have accelerated such changes. In 
addition, many Partner nations are starting to see value in actual PFP activities, irrespective 
of whether they lead to NATO membership. The lessons learned and values fostered 
through the program are intrinsically useful."22 
1. Republicans vs. Democrats 
The problem of bipartisan agreement ofNATO-related strategy is another decisive constraint 
on U.S. policies in Europe. In this context the most important problem is the difference in 
Republican and Democratic positions which have resulted in wide criticism of the President's 
policies. Rapid movement toward NATO expansion was a key foreign policy tenet of the "Contract 
with America" which helped allow the Republican Party to gain control Congress in 1994. 
Republicans leaders of Congress have repeatedly emphasized the need to accelerate the process 
of Eastward NATO expansion. Otherwise, they state, the United States and European balance of 
21 This information have been received during meetings in the State Department and the 
Department ofDefense 09/30/1996. 
22 Message of the Secretary ofDefense, Annual Report to the President and the 
Congress, March 1996. 
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powers will loose all benefits of the Cold War victory. They consider President Clinton's 
"hypersensitivity to Moscow'' as the key impediment to NATO enlargement. During the Presidential 
campaign, Republican nominee Bob Dole emphasized that Republican NATO policies would 
accelerate the Alliance's expansion. In a written statement, submitted in response to President 
Clinton's speech in Detroit on October 22 (when he discusses the possibility of inviting Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic to join NATO in 1999), Mr. Dole emphasized the president's 
unwillingness to move faster on the NATO enlargement issue. Dole claimed that: 
" ... he is still waflling and still unwilling to assert American leadership in NATO. Under 
Bill Clinton NATO enlargement will never happen"23 
After 1996 elections and the victory of President Clinton, it seems likely that Republicans will 
strongly support measures aimed at increasing the American role in new Alliance's strategy. This 
assumption is confirmed by the opinion ofDole adviser and Armed Services member Senator John 
McCain (R-Ariz.) who stated: 
" ... the United States leads NATO, and it should be expanded. And as for why we should 
send American boys to die in Eastern Europe, the answer is the same as it is to the question 
why we were willing to send them to die in Luxemburg during the Cold War. Because 
that's better than having them fight and die in Baltimore. "24 
This remark is the essence of the American concept of national security concept that is likely to 
endure into the next decade. 
The comparison of European-related programs presented by two dominant parties is most 
clearly evident in the debate of the last presidential campaign. On most of these issues the 
23 John F. Hurris, "Clinton Vows Wider NATO in 3 Years", The Washington Post, 
October 23, 1996, Pg. A-01. 
24 See James Kitfield, "America's Not Listening", National Journal 7/13/96., p.1527. 
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Republican nominee Bob Dole and Democratic favorite Bill Clinton did not significantly differ on 
NATO enlargement- which is the essence of the central problem of whether to extend U.S. and 
Western military guarantees to Eastern and Central Europe. Mr. Dole just argued that Mr. Clinton 
was not moving not fast enough. 
2. Congress vs. the President 
Another problem is whether the U.S. Congress will approve the initiative of NATO 
enlargement. Future treaties to provide for the inclusion of new members in the Alliance will require 
two thirds of the votes in the Senate. The same situation took place in 1952, when the Senate barely 
approved membership of Greece and Turkey, in 1955 with the membership of Germany, and Spain 
in 1985. But these decisions were motivated by the conditions of the Cold War. A lot of analysts 
agree with the assumption that the domestic and partisan political pressures will now come to the 
fore. The Republican party included pro-enlargement provisions in the "Contract With America" 
to force the Clinton Administration to speed up the process. The White House resisted this initiative 
as an attempt to restrict the President's authority to conduct foreign policy. 25 
In the context of NATO- oriented politics, a number of experts emphasize that fact that 
President Clinton was the first among all 16 alliance members to take the lead on enlargement, 
arguing in January 1994 that there is no question "whether or not" NATO will enlarge, "but when 
and how". At the same time, Steve Kull notes that Republicans " ... keep trying to make headway on 
foreign policy by emphasizing a more unilateralist posture, increased defense spending and a 
25 See more in the article by Jeremy D. Rosner "NATO Enlargement's American 
Hurdle", Foreign Affairs, July/August 1996. 
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rejection of multilateralism, but polling data indicate that on most of these issues Clinton is much 
closer to the mainstream." Fully 77% of those polled by the program, for instance, opposed 
Congress's addition of $7 billion to the FY 1996 defense budget, and 66% disagreed with the 
statement that it's better for the United States to act on its own when military force is required than 
to work through the United Nations.26 
The cost of enlargement seems to be the main unresolved problem. The involvement of new 
members would force NATO to reshape its military capabilities and infrastructure, and improve 
current armed forces, including defense industries. The preliminary estimated price of expansion and 
subsequent change has recently been estimated by RAND corporation analysts Ronald Asmus and 
Richard Cugler. They predict the amount of spending from $10 billion to $50 billion in the next 10-
15 years. The most possible amount at present situation is $42 billion, where the annual U.S. share 
will be $1 billion. To understand the value of this figure we must compare it with the present 1996 
defense budget. This is only 0. 5% of the present annual defense expenses, and just a tiny part of this 
year's $7 billion Congress' addition to the Department ofDefense' budget. 27 
Another estimation was recently done by the Congressional Budget Office. The results of this 
study predict that the cost of expanding the Alliance will range from $61 billion to $125 billion over 
a 15-year period, with about 10% ofthat borne by the United States. 28 Moreover, Clinton's plans 
do not include the financial guarantees of radical changes in the new Eastern European alliances. 
26 James Kitfield,"America's Not Listening", National Journal7/13/96. P. 1527. 
27 Jeremy D. Rosner, ''NATO Enlargement's American Hurdle", Foreign affairs, 
July/August 1996. 
28 
"Eastern European Countries Lobby for Seat at the NATO Table", The Washington 
Post, October 22, 1996, Pg. A 08 
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Speaking about operational control in Bosnia, Anthony Lake, the National security adviser stated: 
Sometimes it makes practical sense to share the burden, in both manpower and money, 
with our allies. That same view animated the formation of NATO. I think it should 
continue to animate us. The President has said all along that we will work together when 
we can, and alone when we must. 29 
As most analysts predict, the cost factor seems most likely to effect the implementation stage 
of the U.S. commitments on enlargement, rather than at the treaty ratification stage. In terms of the 
present political balance of power between the President and Congress, increasing of NATO-related 
spending will provide a strong background for a broader coalition between them in favor of 
ratification. 
3. Public Support ofForeign Policy 
One of the arguments in the discussion ofNATO-expansion discussion is the question of public 
support, in particular the efficiency of its influence on the decisionmaking process. Critics note that 
American commitments to the process will cause huge budget expenditures which will directly 
affect the interests of taxpayers. Such questions do not usually gain wide public support. 
The role and strategy of the United States in the new Europe will be determined by domestic 
considerations, especially those pertaining to its economic and financial interests and capabilities, 
but the model and size of American interference in European politics will be determined 
considerably by the American people. Why? Any kind of further American engagement in European 
politics will depend on two crucial factors: on the announced intentions of the U.S. government, and 
on the American military forces deployed in Europe. Both of these factors will be largely 
29 See James Kitfield, "America's Not Listening", National Jouma/7/13/96, p.1527 
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determined by the public's wishes. 
Being worried about their annual incomes and everyday problems, average citizens are less 
interested in foreign issues which affect them indirectly. Nevertheless, the balance between 
taxpaying interests and the necessity of foreign program expenditure is a matter of confidence in the 
efficiency of the government's strategy. The real instrument for measuring public opinion is the 
presidential elections. In developed democracies like the United States, public support is sovereign. 
Voting to the particular candidate constituencies are voting for his program 
The ability ofPresident Clinton's Administration to exercise national security strategy can be 
seen in the message of Clinton's national security adviser Antony Lake states: 
Go back to January 1993, and I think you'll understand why the public believes that the 
President has been successful in foreign policy. At that time there was war in Bosnia, 
a refugee tide from Haiti, an aggressive nuclear program in North Korea and thousands 
of Russian missiles pointed at U.S. cities. Today there's peace in Bosnia; we've seen 
the first transition from one elected government to another in Haiti's 2000-years history. 
North Korea's nuclear program is frozen under international supervision and no Russian 
missiles are targeted at our cities. . .. and if you define national security as what makes 
a difference to American citizens in their everyday lives, look at the progress we've 
made towards creating an undivided and democratic Europe, in maintaining security 
presence in Asia, in taking the offensive against the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction and terrorism, and in creating a global trading system that has opened 
markets to the most competitive economy in the world, which is ours. All of those 
things have a direct impact on the lives of everyday Americans. 30 
The results of the last roll firmly confirmed that the Clinton Administration in foreign policy 
can count on the support ofthe majority ofthe nation. 
30 IBID 
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4. The Diaspora 
Many recent publications and discussions over NATO expansion focus on the policymaking 
influence of Central and Eastern European ethnic groups and organizations within the United States. 
In fact, the amount of influence of ethnic minorities to the decisionmaking and level of the President 
team's attention remains unclear. 
Speaking only about Poland as a candidate to the Alliance, analysts say there are nearly 10 
million Polish- Americans and 20 million have ethnic origins in the region of Eastern Europe. 31 This 
argument in debates on NATO expansion and its impact on internal political prices within the nation 
is both strong and weak. On the one hand these people, who comprise about six per cent of all 
constituents, will strongly support the engagement of their historical homelands in a security alliance 
with the United States. On the other hand, (critics state) this question does not have impact in their 
everyday life. Many ethnic organizations, such as the Polish American Congress, have paid a lot of 
effort and attention to the NATO-enlargement issues. As a result, both parties were interested in 
playing their "NATO enlargement- card" in the electoral race. 
Two moments are interesting in this context. First, in the recent "Message on the Observance 
ofPolish American Heritage Month" on October 8, 1996, President Clinton stated: 
. . . the deep cultural and familial ties between the peoples of the United States and 
Poland have been strengthened by our shared values and aspirations. For generations, 
Poles have demonstrated the same reverence for individual rights and dignity that 
infuses our own system of government. The United States supports Poland's democratic 
transition and her people's efforts to establish a pluralistic society and a free market 
economy. Poland and the United States are building a new security for the twenty-first 
31 Data have been taken from "NATO Enlargement's American Hurdle" by Jeremy D. 
Rosner, Foreign Affairs, July/August 1996, p.l3 
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century, working together to prepare for NATO's enlargement in an undivided Europe. 32 
The second point was made by writers for the Washington Post. Talking about the first foreign 
policy speech during the presidential campaign in Detroit on October 22, journalists made the point 
that "Detroit was regarded as a good choice for such a speech because of its population of Central 
and Eastern European ethnics, according to White House aides. "33 The influence of interested 
ethnic Americans in the NATO decisionmaking process could itself be the subject of an entire thesis. 
What is evident, however, is that the White House team pays careful attention to ethnic factors 
dealing with such issues. 
B. THE U.S. POLICY TOWARD EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE IMMEDIATE 
FUTURE 
1. The U.S. Support of NATO Enlargement 
As was explained before, NATO expansion will continue the leading role of the United States 
in European security. The Western European states count on the US to share the expenses ofthe 
Alliance enlargement the East, and Central Europeans want the U.S. to share security guarantees. 
To a large extent the main value of NATO membership is that it provides for the American security 
commitment that comes with this membership. Providing· nuclear and conventional guarantees to 
the states of Central and Eastern Europe states carries risks to the United States if a conflict occurs, 
but (at least in theory) should make the outbreak of conflicts less likely. 
32 Weekly Compilation ofPresidential Documents, October 8, 1996 
33 John F. HURRIS, "Clinton Vows Wider NATO in 3 Years", The Washington Post, 
October 23, 1996, Pg. A 01 
43 
The governments of the new democracies do not trust in Western Europe's ability to provide 
such guarantees, and wish to protect themselves from revitalized Russia. They also feel themselves 
much more comfortable with an American counterbalance to a reunified Germany. The U.S. 
presence in Europe is also desired by the Europeans because of the size and power of the United 
States and the distance between North America and Europe, as long as the U.S. lacks any goals of 
hegemony in the region. 
The abilities of the Alliance to deal with post-Cold War Europe have been tested one more time 
in the Bosnian settlement. NATO has accomplished the mission assigned to it in last year's Dayton 
peace accord. The civilian part of the settlement - the reconstruction, the creation of joint 
government institutions, the return of refugees -is stuck in the mud of bureaucracy and the inability 
of Western diplomats to finish the job. In the eyes of many civilian officials and military officers, 
this problem also resulted because NATO officers and their troops seem to think more creatively 
and push harder to reach solutions than their civilian counterparts. U.S. officers repeatedly tried to 
engage Western diplomats and civilian officials from the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for 
refugees to deal with the impending confrontation. 34 
A decisive force of U.S. involvement in the European politics, from my point of view, is the 
strategy of"enlargement and engagement" proclaimed by President Clinton and his political team. 
The NATO enlargement question has been on the top-priority list of politics for the last four years 
of Mr. Clinton's presidency. The question is sharp, controversial and still under negotiation. Yet, 
the implementation of the course is gradual and successive. The process started with the U.S. 
34 See John Pomfret, "U.S. Army Leads Rebuilding ofBosnia", San Francisco 
Chronicle, November 1,1996 
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leadership when President Clinton made the proposal (which was adopted) that NATO should be 
expanded during the summit in Brussels in January, 1994. Then he reaffirmed the U.S. position 
during his visit to Europe in June, 1994, when he stated that the enlargement of the Alliance is not 
"whether or not", but "when and how". During the ministerial meeting in December, 1994 (under 
the U.S. role again) NATO members adopted for the Organization a two-phase program for 1995. 
The first phase was devoted to internal discussions and agreements of circumstances and sequences 
of enlargement. Then, the issues "what" and "how" were presented individually to the "Partnership 
for Peace" -program members. 35 
For domestic reasons the United States will have to have a more modest military presence in 
Europe, but for strategic reasons it can afford to have a more modest presence. Indeed, as long as 
Russia abides by the norms of common security, the United States should maintain a more modest 
presence. In the case of the American role in Europe at the outset of the post-Cold War era, for once 
all good things do go together. Secretary of State W. Christopher stated on the meeting with foreign 
ministers from the Baltic and Central European counties in Brussels on December 6, 1995, that: 
"The process of enlargement will stay on course_ Our approach will be steady and 
deliberate. For the United States, this process offers the prospect of peaceful integration 
on a continent, where our own security is deeply engaged. Step by step, it gives us the 
opportunity to build a partnership with Europe as a whole. These are the goals we will 
pursue today and in the days ahead. "36 
35 Focus on when and how had also been detailed in the President's speech in Warsaw, 
July, 1994: "As have said, [NATO expansion] is no longer a question of whether, but when and 
how. And that expansion will not depend on the appearance of a new threat in Europe. It will be 
an instrument to advance security and stability for the entire region ... And now what we have to 
do is to get the NATO partners together and to discuss what the next steps should be." 
36 U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Vol.6, No.50. 
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In Central Europe, in Russia, Ukraine, the other New Independent States, the forces of 
reform have earned all our respect and will continue to have the support of the United 
States. Now we must begin to welcome Europe's new democracies into NATO, strengthen 
NATO's partnership with Russia, and build a secure and undivided Europe.37 
Speaking in Detroit on October 22nd, 1996 the President showed the perspectives of NATO 
and European perspectives: 
also pledge for my part and I believe for NATO's part as well, that NATO's doors will not 
close behind its first new members. NATO should remain open to all of Europe's emerging 
democracies who are ready to shoulder the responsibilities of membership. No nation will 
be automatically excluded. No country outside NATO will have a veto."38 
2. The Growing Political Mission of the US Military 
In the course of the present study of the decisionmaking process, I found that the United 
States is placing an increased reliance on U.S. military institutions and organizations in the face of 
continued budget cuts for the State Department and other non-military international affairs 
programs. In FY 1996 the U.S. government spent on its international affairs programs$ 18.6 billion, 
down from the previous year level of$ 20.1 billion.39 Even the budget ofthe U.S. foreign service 
has been cut tremendously: 
... the US foreign affairs budget has been cut so sharply (51 percent in real terms since 
1984) and the US is now so deeply in arrears to the U.N., the World Bank and the World 
Health Organization (which are owed more than $2 billion) and the foreign aid budget has 
been reduced so far (Egypt and Israel now get almost the whole thing) that the ability of 
37 Remarks to the 51st Session ofthe United Nations General Assembly in New York 
City. September 24, 1996 
38 Remarks to the Community in Detroit, Michigan, October 22, 1996, Weekly 
Compilation ofPresidential Documents, Vol.32-No 43, October 28, 1996, p.2143 
39 Casimir A. Yost, "The Raid on Aid", The Washington Post, July 28, 1996, Pg. C-0 1. 
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the next President to maintain U.S. leadership and conduct real preventive diplomacy will 
be severely handicapped unless he can cut a new "Grand bargain" with Congress. 40 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher accused Congress yesterday of endangering US security 
by cutting so deeply into spending on diplomacy that future administrations will be unable to 
respond to international crisis without early use of military force. "If we rely on our military strength 
alone, we will end up using our military all the time," Christopher said in a speech to the West Point 
corps of cadets. 41 
In the real world, the failure to maintain diplomatic readiness will inevitably shift the 
burden to America's military. Diplomacy that is not backed by the credible threat or use 
of force can be hollow - and ultimately dangerous, ... but if we do not use diplomacy to 
promote our vital interests, we will surely find ourselves defending them on the 
battlefield. 42 
State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns said the foreign affairs budget, which was just 
under $20 billion a year when the Clinton administration took office, now is $2.5 billion a year 
lower. 
The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD) at Georgetown University released a report, 
"U.S. Foreign Affairs Resources: Budget cuts and Consequences," last July which states that the 
State Department is currently funded at the same level as it was in 1991 despite the necessity to open 
19 new embassies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The U.S. Information Agency, 
the organization that informs foreign citizens about the achievements ofU.S. democracy abroad, has 
40 Thomas L. Friedman, "Your Mission, Should You Accept It", The New York Times, 
October 27, 1996. 




had its operating budget cut by 20% since 1991, and one-quarter of its work force has been 
downsized since 1994. The lSD report paints a gloomy picture of the future. Anticipating the 
balanced budget of FY 2002, it predicts reduction of another $4 billion in current dollars from 
current $ 18.6 billion in FY 1996 for international affairs programs. That budget figure includes 
military assistance as well as funding for nonmilitary programs, but the specific areas of the cuts 
have not been delineated. "Our international programs and activities buy us influence worldwide. 
They are part of leadership, but they also assist us in promoting our global interests and values. It 
borders on the irresponsible to believe that the United States' global position can be secured through 
defense expenditures alone."43 
Congressional cuts of the State Department's budget will result in the closing of more than 30 
U.S. overseas missions. At the same time Mr. Dole in his article in "Foreign Policy'' noted, that 
"Reform and reductions in the U.S. aid program are the overseas equivalent of welfare reform at 
home". This seems strange, especially bearing in mind the fact that the amount spent for foreign 
affairs programs and personnel presents a small part of the amount the American nation earns from 
or of the amount it is forced to spend in the cases when foreign crisis turns into any possible war or 
conflict. 
In his Address at the Foreign Service Institute on September 10, 1996 the Deputy Secretary of 
State Strobe Talbott stated that: 
Our environmental assistance to the new independent states of the former Soviet Union has 
fallen from nearly $75 million in FY 1995 to less then $10 million in FY 1997. That's a 
43 Casimir A Yost and Mary Locke, "The Raid on Aid", The Washington Post, July 28, 
1996. 
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dramatic retreat on a crucial front. 44 
The U.S. Department of State " ... spends just a little more than 1% of the total federal budget 
on foreign affairs, in contrast to the approximately 18% still spent on defense. 
Foreign assistance programs have ultimately put more dollars into the pockets of American 
taxpayers than they have ever taken out. Most foreign assistance dollars stay right here at 
home. Nearly 80% ofUSAID contracts and grants go to U.S. firms. Ninety-five per cent 
of all food assistance purchases are made in the U.S., and virtually all military assistance 
is spent on U.S. goods and services. 45 
The Republican Congress has pushed a firmer policy toward Russia and a reduction in foreign 
aid programs in general. One of these programs is the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Program which insists on the reduction and monitoring of former Soviet nuclear weapons. The cuts 
of this program mean slowing down the implementation ofthe START treaty. 
At the same time the non-military funding for international security has been slashed, the U.S. 
Army put into practice its skills in the course of implementing the "Partnership for Peace " program 
and the settlement in Bosnia (which is most important in terms of the Congressional debates) and 
has had very positive results. 
NATO's influence here is massive," a western ambassador said. "Their organizational and 
management skills make us look like kids selling lemonade on a Sunday afternoon."46 
Speaking on the topic oflessons resulting from Yugoslavian conflict, Madeleine K. Albright, 
44 Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott,"The Global Environment and The National 
Interest", Address at the Foreign Service Institute, Arlington, Virginia, September 10, 1996. U.S. 
Department of State Dispatch. Vol. 7, No.36. 
45 IBID. 
46 Quoted from "U.S. ARMY Leads Rebuilding ofBosnia", John Pomfret's article in San 
Francisco Chronicle, November 1,1996. 
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U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations said: 
... if a team is to function successful, as each player must acknowledge the validity of the 
other's perspectives. The diplomats must think a little like generals. The military 
commanders must be at their most diplomatic . All must focus on the goal of a durable 
peace. And together, we must meet and surmount a series of tests. 47 
3. The Participation of Congress in Implementing Foreign Policy 
To provide effective implementation of his foreign policy programs in terms of Congressional 
approval, President Clinton should include some of the leading Republicans on his decisionmaking 
team. It is commonly thought that this step would provide considerable support of foreign policy 
propositions in both bodies of the Republican-dominated Congress. Such a scenario, on the one 
hand, would make treaty ratifications and budgetary spending easier for the President and, on the 
other hand, will provide additional points of Congressional influence on the executive branch. 
The President should also enlist the Joint Chief of Staff in his lobbying . Let the generals 
explain to Congress the importance of having sufficient diplomatic resources so troops 
aren't the only option. Moreover, President Clinton, it he does win, should appoint several 
well-known Republican foreign policy figures to his team. Without a real bipartisan 
approach, no progress on the foreign affaires budget will be possible .... The President needs 
to help nurture a whole new foreign policy generation, and he could start by giving them 
political cover for traveling. Lawmakers , fearful of being accused of junketing, don't 
travel anymore. Those, who don't travel don't know. Those who don't know don't care.48 
The realization of this tactic in terms of decisionmaking would have a number of results: 
1) the team of the Democrat President would become partly Republican; 
47 Madeleine Albright, "The United Nations, NATO, And Crisis management", Address 
at the SHAPE-EX 1996 Conference, Brussels, Belgium, Apri125, 1996, U.S. Department of 
State Dispatch, April29, 1996, Vol. 7, No. 18) 
48 L. Friedman, "Your Mission, Should You Accept It", the New York Times, October 
27,1996. 
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2) consequently, the foreign policy actions would become more bipartisan. In terms of NATO 
enlargement it means stronger support of the process; 
3) the participation of key Republican congressmen would facilitate the ratification and 
implementation of presidential initiatives; 
4) the process of the creation of national security concepts and priorities would be concentrated 
(more or less) in the hands of the closest to the President think-tanks; 
4. The Impact of the "Russian Factor" 
Why should the Russian position be taken into consideration in terms of U.S. policies toward 
NATO and Europe? Regardless of different opinions among political analysts, it will be necessary 
for the American government to deal with such questions as whether to include Russia as a 
participant of all- European process, while not giving it a veto over NATO or EU' s future, in order 
to minimize the negative impact on Russian internal politics of NATO expansion, and to guard 
against any possible counter-moves against Ukraine, Baltic States and other neighbors. 
The new Alliance's strategy includes an effort to convince Russia that NATO should no longer 
be considered an anti - Russian bloc. As former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote, 
Neither the alliance nor its prospective new members are facing any imminent threat. Talk 
of a "new Yalta" or of a Russian military threat is not justified, either by actual 
circumstances or even by worst - case scenarios for the near future. The expansion of 
NATO should, therefore, not be driven by whipping up anti- Russian hysteria that could 
eventually become a self- fulfilling prophecy."49 
Actually there is no final decision about NATO enlargement within the political elites of the 
49 Foreign Affairs, January/February, 1995. 
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Russian Federation. Some of the key officials favored Russian joining NAT0.50 Others like the 
Russian Foreign minister Primakov have rejected the idea of the Alliance's expansion, which makes 
"the axis of a new European system". 51 At the same time Russia is becoming more and more 
involved in the process of cooperation with the Alliance. Its Defense Minister in the beginning of 
last September even proposed opening Russian liaison offices in NATO headquarters in Belgium 
and at the U.S. Atlantic Command. in Norfolk, with NATO to open an office in Moscow. 52 
Unfortunately, the majority of the Russian political elites, including both Democrats and 
Nationalists, oppose NATO expansion. 
U.S. policymakers may need to provide some kind of "compensation" for Russia and 
management of its politics toward its Eastern European neighbors. Russia's political reaction can 
also affect the implementation of already existing agreements, such as the Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty or Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START II) Treaty. In the 
present situation the most real variant of further settlement of this problem is an agreement to a 
strategic NATO- Russian Security Treaty with special U.S. guarantees. 
Talking about the present level of U.S.- Russian bilateral relations, "for all its troubles and 
waning power, Russia still occupies a special place in the council of America's President and his 
national security advisers." This opinion was underscored by Senators Richard Lugar and Sam 
Nunn after a closed-door meeting in Moscow in early October of members of the Russian parliament 
50 See "Security Chief Suggests Russia Could Join NATO", "Russia today" 13/11/96., 
www 
51 John M. Gorshko, "Top Russian aide Details Policy splits", The Washington Post, 
September 25, 1996, Pg.28. 
52 
"Should we Be in Europe?", The Washington Post, September 16, 1996, Pg. A18 
52 
and a U.S. delegation consisting of Defense Minister William J. Perry and Sens. Lugar and Sam 
Nunn. 53 
It is possible that the United States, for domestic reasons and in spite ofEuropean opposition, 
were to decide to cut its involvement in NATO-related activities. The growing pressure of domestic 
problems and the growing difficulties of the political elites in developing support for America's 
engagement in the world could lead to such an outcome -- despite the long-range costs to American 
interests. For better or for worse, the possibility of such a scenario will force European political 
circles to pay careful attention to their own security capabilities. Currently, if a threat arises, 
Europeans hope that the United States will still join them. Moreover, no responsible authority in 
Europe wants a decrease of U.S. commitment to NATO. However, the creation of a European 
security system would not only create a fall back position, but would also increase NATO's ability 
to act, hopefully, in accord with a United States that leads the strategy ofNATO's transition. 




The expansion of the U.S. commitments to New Europe corresponds to the way key U.S. policy 
making institutions have framed American national interests. NATO enlargement advances 
American interests by accelerating the success of democratic and market economy reforms in 
Eastern European countries and Russia. President Clinton has argued that this success is in 
America's own national interests; indeed, he has stated that " ... our security in this generation will 
be shaped by whether reform in these nations succeeds." But NATO enlargement also serves a more 
defensive mission -- that of pushing back rising nationalism in the East. NATO is still needed, 
despite the end of the Cold War, because "the dream of an empire is still burns in the minds of some 
who look longingly toward a brutal past." The new NATO doctrine is one of"pre-containment:" 
work for reform but be prepared for aggression. 54 
The process that led to this policy reflects the flexibility ofthe U.S. decisionmaking structure, 
and the sharing of powers between Congress, the president and other key actors. Each phase of 
policymaking process (such as the definition of tasks, the adoption and implementation policies, and 
the funding ofU.S. commitments) depends completely on the ability of these institutions to hammer 
out a common interpretation of national interests. 
The interpretation of these national interests, in tum, have been shaped by two factors: 
geostrategic perspectives and domestic political concerns and interests. Wide agreement has 
emerged between Congress and the Executive branch that NATO enlargement serves U.S. 
54 William Schneider, "Test- Marketing the Clinton Doctrine", National Journal, 1122/ 
1994, p.214. 
55 
geostrategic interests. Yet, NATO issues a re also a source of possible partisan conflict. 
Republicans in Congress have chided President Clinton for proceeding too slowly on NATO 
enlargement, and pushed for a more rapid pace. This bodes well for the Vishegrad nations. Over 
the longer term, however, important strategic uncertainties persist -- and with them, new 
opportunities for partisan conflict. Political pressures to cut spending on foreign affairs, and increase 
funding for domestic programs, may encourage policymakers in the future to consider maintaining 
a more modest military presence in Europe. Such a reduction in U.S. force levels might also make 
strategic sense, if doing so helped ease the political problems that NATO enlargement poses to pro-
Democracy politicians in Russia. The possibility of a reduction in the U.S. presence will also force 
European political circles to pay closer attention to their own security capabilities. No responsible 
authority in Europe wants a decreased U.S. commitment to NATO. However, if concerns over 
potential U.S. reductions were to strengthen the Europeans' commitment to provide for their own 
defense, this would create not only a fall-back position for European security but would also 
increase NATO's ability to act-- hopefully, in accord with U.S. strategy. 
The initial responsibility for resolving these issues will be concentrated within the restricted 
group of the President's cabinet-level nominees, and possibly the under-secretary level in the cases 
of the Department of Defense and the Department of State. But more near-term issues (such as the 
possible inclusion of the Vishegrad countries in NATO) will involve Congress, particularly the 
Senate in its treaty ratification role. Moreover, beyond the Vishegrad countries, special problems 
may emerge in congressional attitudes toward enlargement. Congressional support will depend on 
the ability of particular states to manage their own democratic changes and make the transition to 
a market economy. The success and results ofthis management will affect significantly Congress' 
56 
willingness to approve the U.S. security commitments (including sending American military and 
financial resources overseas). Such issues could already loom large by 1998, the year of midterm 
elections and of final decisions on NATO enlargement. 
A broader tendency within the U.S. government -- and on of potentially great importance to 
Europe -- lies in the area of traditional and non-traditional measures of policymaking. There is a 
strong shift of policymaking instruments from the foreign service (and other traditional instruments 
of diplomacy) to military institutions and non-military employees of the Department of Defense. 
Especially in the framework of NATO enlargement, "military-to military" contacts and related 
programs are gaining increased prominence. The character of these new military missions will 
accelerate the shift of DoD's responsibilities from "military" to "political-military " roles. The 
Department of Defense is likely to increase the number of civilian expert personnel to fulfill these 
functions .. At the same time, the United States is attempting to improve the quality of its even as 
force reductions continue. For future U.S. policymaking on NATO enlargement, this analysis 
suggests that the voice of the Department ofDefense will continue to grow, and that the nations of 
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